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Abstract 
What is the impact of negative interest rates on bank lending and risk-taking? To answer this 
question we study the changes in lending policies using both the Euro area Bank Lending 
Survey and the Spanish Credit Register. Banks whose net interest income is adversely affected 
by negative rates are concurrently lowly capitalized, take less risk and adjust loan terms and 
conditions to shore up their risk weighted assets and capital ratios. These banks also increase 
non-interest charges more. But, importantly, we find no differences in banks’ credit supply or 
standard setting, neither in the Euro area nor in Spain. These findings suggest that negative 
rates do not necessarily contract the supply of credit and that the so-called “reversal rate” 
may not have been reached yet. 
Keywords: negative interest rates, risk taking, lending policies. 





¿Cuál es el impacto de los tipos de interés negativos en la oferta de crédito y en la asunción de 
riesgos por parte de los bancos? Para responder a esta pregunta estudiamos los cambios en 
las políticas crediticias a partir de la Encuesta sobre Préstamos Bancarios del área del euro y de 
registro de crédito español. Los bancos cuyos ingresos netos por intereses están adversamente 
afectados por los tipos de interés negativos están poco capitalizados, corren menos riesgos y 
ajustan las condiciones de los préstamos para reforzar sus activos ponderados por riesgo y sus 
ratios de capital. Estos bancos también aumentan sus comisiones. Por el contrario, no 
encontramos diferencias en la oferta de crédito y en los criterios de concesión de préstamos 
ni en el área del euro ni en España. Estos resultados sugieren que los tipos de interés negativos 
no contraen necesariamente la oferta de crédito y que el reversal rate aún no se ha alcanzado. 
Palabras clave: tipos de interés negativos, asunción de riesgos, políticas crediticias. 
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1 Introduction 
A commonly shared view is that low interest rates maintained for an extended period may 
reduce banks’ net lending margins. Very low short-term rates during the recent crisis and its 
aftermath have typically come hand in hand with a lower and flatter yield curve which renders 
maturity-transformation activities less profitable by pressing down net interest income. For a 
sufficiently low short-term rate, this latter effect, so the argument goes, will eventually dominate 
the positive effects of low rates on loan loss provisions and on non-interest income (see Borio 
et al., 2015). Moreover, in an environment featuring negative policy rates – the one on which 
this paper focuses – the incidence of an effective lower bound on the remuneration of 
commercial banks deposits will exacerbate this negative loop between low rates and net 
lending margins (see Eisenschmidt and Smets, 2017 and Heider et al., 2017). 
A positive relation between the level of interest rates and bank profitability has been 
documented by Alessandri and Neleon (2012), Genay and Podjasek (2014), Borio et al. 
(2015), Busch and Memmel (2015), and Claessens et al. (2017), among others.1 2 But, 
certainly, banks may mitigate the negative effect of falling interest rates by raising lending 
volumes, lowering interest expenses (Scheiber et al., 2016), increasing loan spreads 
(Sääskilahti, 2016), lowering risk provisioning (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009; Borio et al., 2015), 
setting higher fees (Turk, 2106), or taking more risk (Albertazzi et al., 2016; Heider et al., 
2017).3, 4 How banks adjust the previous levers of their lending policies will ultimately determine 
the way in which negative rates affect the overall supply of credit to the economy and the 
profitability of banks. 
Thus, identifying the channels through which interest rates shape bank profitability is a 
key piece to understand the reaction of banks in a context of persistently negative interest 
rates. The recent empirical literature has explored a wide array of channels through which 
negative rates may harm profitability. A first channel relates to the degree of the banks’ reliance 
on retail deposit funding, on which they typically find difficult to charge negative interest rates 
(Heider et al., 2017).5 Secondly, banks maintaining excess liquidity may face a negative return 
on reserves (Demiralp et al., 2017; Basten and Mariathasan, 2018), whereas floating rate 
holdings may cause capital losses. Finally, a low net worth may lead to binding capital 
constraints and limit banks’ risk taking ability, hence restraining their capacity to raise lending 
margins by charging higher spreads to riskier borrowers (Brunnermeier and Koby, 2017). 
Banks with low net worth may initially benefit from decreasing interest rates through 
improved access to financing, and respond by lending more and taking more risks. However, 
as deposit funding costs at some point remain stuck above zero but lending yields continue to 
                                                                          
1 This statement is not true if one attends to specific countries such as Denmark or Sweden (Turk, 2016) or the previous 
two countries plus Switzerland (Scheiber et al., 2016). This view has also been recently challenged by Altavilla et al. 
(2017), who show that monetary policy easing is not associated with lower bank profits once they control for the 
endogeneity of the policy measures to expected macroeconomic and financial conditions. In other words, the positive 
correlation between interest rates and bank profits occurs because they are simultaneously determined by 
macroeconomic and financial conditions, but there is no causal relation between the two, at least not in the short run. 
2 For detailed descriptive evidence on the negative interest rate policy and bank profitability in the euro area see Jobst 
and Lin (2016). 
3 This empirical evidence is consistent with the one documented following the introduction of the large-scale asset 
purchase programs in US (see Kandrac and Schulsche, 2016 and Kurtzman et al., 2017). 
4 A low interest rate environment could also affect banks’ equity values (see Ampudia and Van den Heuvel, 2017). 
5 There is in fact some evidence that banks have been reluctant to pass negative policy rates on to retail depositors 
(Bech and Malkohozov, 2016). 
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drop, the downward pressure on intermediation margin and, hence, on retained earnings  
(and capacity to build up capital organically) makes low net worth banks curtail lending and 
risk-taking more than high net worth banks. However, during the post crisis period low net 
worth banks were under particularly intense regulatory scrutiny about their lending policies and 
risk-taking behaviour. 
Notice that the relationship between bank capital and risk taking is a priori ambiguous. 
The risk-shifting hypothesis (also called gambling for resurrection or asset-substitution) 
introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) implies stronger risk-taking by less capitalised 
banks. In short, if their skin in the game is low, banks may take more risk (Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1997; Freixas and Rochet, 2008). By contrast, according to the risk-bearing capacity 
hypothesis (e.g., Adrian and Shin, 2011), higher bank capital allows more risk taking simply 
because of its loss-absorbing capacity. The relationship may also vary along the economic 
cycle and most evidence pertains to pre-crisis times when bank capital ratios were relatively 
low, and so were capital requirements. An exception on this account is recent work by Peydró, 
Polo and Sette (2017) who find evidence for Italy during the crisis supporting the risk-bearing 
capacity hypothesis.6 
Our paper offers new empirical evidence on the relevance of the various channels 
through which negative interest rates affect banks’ net lending margins in the context of the 
recent experience of the Euro area, where the European Central Bank (ECB) has set a negative 
deposit facility rate since 2014. To this aim, we exploit the non-anonymised answers to the 
Bank Lending Survey (iBLS) and the individual balance-sheet data and interest-rate data  
(IBSI and IMIR databases, respectively) of a wide sample of Euro area banks. The survey 
contains a question that deals explicitly with the effect of negative interest rates on banks’ net 
interest income. More specifically, banks are asked whether the ECB’s negative deposit facility 
rate (DFR) contributed to a decrease or an increase in their net interest income. 
We then explore several banks’ characteristics that may determine the way in which 
lending margins are affected by negative interest rates. Crucially, we find that those banks that 
report a negative incidence of negative rates on their net income (henceforth, affected banks) 
have capital ratios that on average are significantly lower than those that report to be 
unaffected. 
Why are lending margins of banks with worse capital ratios more affected by negative 
interest rates? Following a drop in the interest rate, the negative effect of lower unit lending 
margins on a bank’s profit can be partially offset by raising the supply of loans. But low capital 
ratios may put a limit on the loan supply, as emphasized by Brunnermeier and Koby (2017). As 
interest rates reach very low levels for a prolonged period of time, and bank capital is scarce 
and expensive – arguably, two prominent features of the current European banking landscape 
– the previous bank-profit eroding mechanism is likely to be more operational, giving rise to a 
link between the banks’ capital position and the effect of negative rates on their profitability. As 
the argument goes, it is then reasonable to expect banks with lower capital ratios to rebalance 
their credit portfolio towards safer loans in the form of shorter maturities, smaller loan size and 
higher collateral requirements to improve their risk weighted assets and in turn their regulatory 
capital ratios. In parallel, low capital ratios may provide incentives to raise non-interest charges, 
like commissions and fees, as an alternative way to build up capital organically. 
                                                                          
6 They find that softer monetary policy makes less capitalized banks buy more securities (rather than increasing credit 
supply), but with lower yields in comparison to more capitalized banks, which constitutes evidence against risk shifting. 
Consistent with risk-bearing capacity, the effect is particularly strong in the portfolios where securities are marked to 
market, as in those portfolios unrealized changes in value are reflected in the income statement as profits or losses. 
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Our empirical results offer support for the previous mechanism. Exploiting data from a 
large sample of Euro area banks, we find that those banks that report a higher impact of 
negative interest rates on their income tend to exhibit a lower risk tolerance and to grant loans 
with shorter maturity and lower average loan size. We find that the lower risk-taking goes hand 
in hand with lower risk-weighted assets (RWA). We report qualitatively consistent findings when 
we employ loan level data obtained from the Spanish Credit Register. In addition, we find that 
those European banks whose net interest income is adversely affected by the negative interest 
rates increase commissions and fees significantly more than unaffected banks. 
The Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR), in place since January 2014, envisage several capital-based measures to enhance the 
resilience of the European financial system and limit the build-up of vulnerabilities. Besides 
macroprudential capital buffers that should be fully implemented as of January 2022, regulators 
might also require additional buffers to individual financial institutions under Pillar 2 based on 
either a macro- or micro-prudential perspective. In addition to those capital requirements, 
banks could opt to have capital ratios well above the required ones either for signaling 
purposes, shock absorption, or their proper functioning in periods of stress (see Myers, 1984; 
Marcus, 1984; Berger et al., 2008; and Jokipii and Milne, 2008; among others). Thus, the 
results should not be interpreted based solely on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy but 
on the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies. 
Another important question is: How do negative interest rates affect the supply of 
bank credit? The answers in the previous literature are mixed. While there exists empirical 
evidence that supports the view that negative rates are effective in stimulating bank lending 
(Demiralp et al., 2017; Rostagno et al., 2016), other work documents a modest or even 
negligible expansion of credit (Borio and Gambacorta, 2017), whereas some recent work even 
finds a contraction in lending (Heider et al., 2017). Brunnermeier and Koby (2017) argue that 
below a given policy rate (which they label as the “reversal rate”), which is not necessarily zero, 
further reductions in the rate will lower bank profitability and reduce capital generation via 
retained earnings, thereby eventually restricting lending. Our results obtained from the sample of 
European banks suggest that there are no significant differences in terms of the total amount  
of credit supplied by those banks whose net interest income is affected by negative interest 
rates and those that are not. Within the logic of Brunnermeier’s and Koby’s (2017), this result 
would provide support to the view that for the average euro area bank the reversal rate has not 
been reached (yet). 
Consistently with the previous finding for the whole European sample, based on 
detailed information at the loan level for Spain, we observe that there are no significant 
differences in the variation of lending by those banks whose net interest income was affected 
by negative interest rates as compared to those that were not affected. Interestingly, following 
the inception of a negative DFR in June 2014 affected banks cut (increased) their supply of 
credit to riskier (safer) firms by more than unaffected banks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the main 
datasets employed in our analysis. Section 3 describes the channels through which negative 
interest rates affect bank profitability. In section 4 we study the effect of negative rates on credit 
supply. Section 5 contains several analyses on the rebalancing of Euro area banks’ credit 
portfolio to overcome the effects of negative interest rates. Section 6 provides further evidence 
based on loan level data obtained from the Banco de España’s credit registry in line with 
previous results at the Euro area level. Section 7 concludes. 
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2 Data and variables  
The data employed in the baseline analyses come from three sources: The Individual Bank 
Lending Survey (iBLS), the Individual Balance Sheet Items (IBSI) and the Individual MFI Interest 
Rate (IMIR) databases. The iBLS database contains confidential, non-anonymized replies to the 
ECB’s Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for a subsample of banks participating in the BLS. The BLS 
is a quarterly survey through which euro area banks are asked about developments in their 
respective credit markets since 2003.7 Currently the sample comprises more than 140 banks 
from 19 euro area countries, with coverage of around 60% of the amount outstanding of loans 
to the private non-financial sector in the euro area. However, there are six countries that do not 
share the confidential, non-anonymized replies to the BLS, so they are excluded from the iBLS 
(see Table 1 for a view of the distribution of observations per country).8 
The BLS is especially designed to distinguish between supply and demand conditions 
in the euro area credit markets. Supply conditions are measured through credit standards (i.e., 
the internal guidelines or loan approval criteria of a bank), credit terms and conditions, and the 
various factors that may have caused them to change.9 In fact, the credit standards measure 
contained in the BLS has been used as a proxy for banks’ credit supply in some previous 
literature.10 The BLS also contains information on the evolution of credit demand by firms and 
households and the factors underlying these developments. In addition, several ad hoc 
questions have been added in the recent years to analyze the impact of the main ECB’s non-
standard monetary policy measures, such as the negative DFR, on several dimensions such as 
banks’ balance sheets, credit standards and terms and conditions. 
IBSI and IMIR contain balance-sheet and interest rate information of the 300 euro area 
largest banks,11 which is individually transmitted on a monthly basis from the national central 
banks to the ECB since July 2007. We have matched both datasets with the iBLS. We restrict 
the sample to the period spanning from 2014Q2 (i.e., when the negative DFR was introduced) 
to 2017Q3.12 The resulting sample contains 1,680 observations corresponding to 122 banks 
                                                                          
7 For more detailed information about the survey see Köhler-Ulbrich, Hempell and Scopel (2016).Visit also 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/bank_lending_survey/html/index.en.html. 
8 Germany participates in the iBLS with a sub-sample of banks that have agreed to transmit their non-anonymized 
replies to the ECB. 
9 According to the BLS, credit standards are the internal guidelines or loan approval criteria of a bank. They are 
established prior to the actual loan negotiation on the terms and conditions and the actual loan approval/rejection 
decision. They define the types of loan a bank considers desirable and undesirable, the designated sectoral or 
geographic priorities, the collateral deemed acceptable and unacceptable, etc. Credit standards specify the required 
borrower characteristics (e.g., balance sheet conditions, income situation, age, employment status) under which a loan 
can be obtained. On the other side, credit terms and conditions refer to the conditions of a loan that a bank is willing to 
grant, i.e., to the terms and conditions of the individual loan actually approved as laid down in the loan contract which 
was agreed between the bank and the borrower. They generally consist of the agreed spread over the relevant 
reference rate, the size of the loan, the access conditions and other terms and conditions in the form of non-interest 
rate charges (i.e., fees), collateral or guarantees which the respective borrower needs to provide (including 
compensating balances), loan covenants and the agreed loan maturity. 
10 See, for instance, Buca and Vermeulen (2017), who combine answers to the BLS and aggregate balance sheets from 
BACH to show that, following a tightening in credit supply, investment falls substantially more in bank-dependent 
industries. 
11 55 monthly time series are required on the asset side, which include data on holdings of cash, loans, debt securities, 
MMF shares/units, equity and non-MMF investment fund shares/units, non-financial assets and remaining assets. On 
the liability side, the time series cover information on deposits, included and not included in M3, issuance of debt 
securities, capital and reserves and remaining liabilities. 
12 As most regressors are lagged one period, they are measured in the period spanning 2014Q1 to 2017Q2. 
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from 13 countries (see Table 1 for a view of the distribution of observations per country).13 
However, the estimation sample will be generally smaller due to missing values. 
The definitions of the variables used in this study are displayed in Table 2. The main 
dependent variables are changes in credit standards and non-price terms and conditions in the 
loans to enterprises, as reported in the BLS. In particular, the BLS asks banks on a quarterly 
basis about the evolution of the credit standards applied to their new loans or credit lines to 
enterprises, the margins charged on them and other non-price terms and conditions (non-
interest charges, size of the loan, collateral requirements, loan covenants, and maturity). Banks 
must answer whether they have tightened them, kept them basically unchanged or eased over 
the past three months. While the BLS differentiates between “tightened considerably” and 
“tightened somewhat” and between “eased considerably” and “eased somewhat”, we 
aggregate these categories into “tightened” and “eased”, as done in the regular BLS reports 
prepared by the ECB. In addition, in some of the analyses our dependent variable will be risk 
tolerance, i.e., the changes in the bank’s risk tolerance in the past three months (decreased, 
remained unchanged or increased). Finally, in some analyses we will use the variable credit 
growth, which is the quarterly growth rate of outstanding loans to non-financial corporations. 
 Table 3, in which descriptive statistics of the dependent variables are presented, 
shows that most of the time (over 90% of the observations) credit standards remained 
unchanged. In addition, credit standards were more likely to ease (5%) than to tighten (around 
2%), which is consistent with the phase of economic recovery observed during the sample 
period, as it is confirmed by an average quarterly credit growth of 0.20%. Terms and conditions 
were also very stable, and the probability of easing was somewhat larger than the probability of 
tightening during the sample period. Most observations (97%) are associated with a stable level 
of banks’ risk tolerance. 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the banks’ characteristics. Our key 
regressor is NDFR, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank reported that the ECB’s 
negative DFR contributed to a decrease of the bank’s net interest income in the past six 
months and 0 otherwise. The variable is constructed using an ad-hoc question that has been 
asked four times on a semi-annual basis since April 2016.14 According to Table 4, 73% of the 
observations correspond to banks affected by the negative DFR. The percentage of affected 
banks has risen slightly over time, from 71% in April 2016 to 74% in October 2017, reaching its 
peak in October 2016 (80.2%). 
In addition, we use balance sheet information and the interest rate data of IBSI and 
IMIR to construct several controls at the individual bank level. We proxy bank size with the 
natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets (size). Leverage is defined as the ratio of capital and 
reserves over total unweighted assets (capital ratio). Liquidity is measured with a liquidity ratio, 
expressed as the sum of cash, holdings of government securities and Eurosystem deposits 
over total assets (%) and with a loan-to-deposit ratio. The importance of deposits as a funding 
source is captured with the deposit ratio, the ratio between the deposits by households and 
non-financial corporations over total assets. An important control is the total borrowing from 
the Eurosystem over total assets (Eurosystem borrowing). This variable includes the amounts 
                                                                          
13 The level of consolidation of the banking group differs between BLS and IBSI. Consequently, we have 122 banks in 
IBSI but 105 banks in BLS, because sometimes the head of the group is the one that answers to the BLS but we have 
unconsolidated balance sheets of the head and its subsidiaries in IBSI. 
14 The exact wording of the question is: “Given the ECB’s negative deposit facility rate, did this measure, either directly or 
indirectly, contribute to a decrease / increase of your bank’s net interest income over the past six months?” While the 
question refers to the last six months, it cannot be ruled out that banks reported the cumulative impact since the 
introduction of the negative DFR when answering the question by the first time in April 2016. 
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taken up by the banks in the first and second series of the targeted longer-term refinancing 
operations (TLTRO I and TLTRO II). As both the TLTRO I and the negative DFR were 
announced in June 2014,15 as part of the credit easing package, it is important to take into 
account the liquidity obtained in the TLTRO when assessing the effect of negative interest rates 
on credit standards and loan terms and conditions. Finally, we also control for the bank’s legal 
form (head institution, national subsidiary, foreign subsidiary, foreign branch). Around 75% of 
the observations belong to domestic banks (head institutions or national subsidiaries) while 
around 25% belong to foreign banks (mainly foreign subsidiaries). 
In our empirical exercises we also use controls for the firms’ demand for credit. In 
particular, the BLS asks banks about perceived changes in the demand for loans or credit lines 
to enterprises. Banks must answer whether the demand for their loans has decreased, has 
remained basically unchanged or has increased over the past three months. As with the supply 
indicators, we merge “decreased considerably” and “decreased somewhat” into “decreased” 
and “increased considerably” and “increased somewhat” into “increased”. The descriptive 
statistics of the demand variables are displayed in Table 5. We differentiate between demand 
for loans from SMEs and large firms and also between short-term loans and long-term loans. 
We also distinguish the evolution of credit demand according to the purpose of the loan (loans 
for fixed investment, for inventories and working capital, for mergers and acquisitions and for 
debt refinancing). The demand indicators are also relatively stable, but they change more 
frequently than credit standards and terms and conditions. In addition, demand is more likely to 
increase than to decrease, as expected in a period of economic recovery. 
Table 6 shows the distribution of affected and non-affected banks by country. Across 
the largest euro area countries, German banks account for more than 26% of the affected 
banks and Italian ones for 16%, while French and Spanish banks account for 8% and 7%, 
respectively. 
                                                                          
15 The negative DFR was introduced on 11 June 2014, the TLTRO-I were announced on 5 June 2014. 
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3 Understanding the characteristics of banks adversely affected by negative 
interest rates 
A key identification challenge is to measure the shock implied by the introduction of the 
negative DFR. Although previous studies have used several proxies to identify this shock,16  
the negative DFR is likely to impact banks’ profitability through several channels. First, affected 
banks may have high levels of excess liquidity, as the negative DFR implies a direct cost to 
those banks holding excess reserves. Second, these banks may have a high share of retail 
deposits, as the existence of cash as a zero-return store of value implies that banks are 
reluctant to charge negative interest rates to retail depositors. Third, affected banks may have a 
high share of floating-rate loans or short-term loans, which are repriced at a lower rate 
following a reduction in the interest rate. Those factors squeeze banks’ net interest margins 
and erode banks’ net worth via a reduction in retained earnings.  
Confronted with these issues, we first exploit the answers to the BLS question about the 
incidence of negative rates on banks’ profitability. Specifically, we consider that a bank has 
been negatively affected if it reports that the negative DFR contributed to a decrease in its net 
interest income. This allows us to abstract from the specific channel through which the 
negative DFR influences bank profitability (charge on excess liquidity, deposit rates floored at 
zero, floating-rate loans, short-term loans, lower risk-taking, etc.) and to focus on the final 
outcome, i.e., the decrease in net interest income. Table 7 reports the characteristics of banks 
affected and not affected by the negative DFR (NDFR=1 and NDFR=0, respectively). In 
particular, the table displays the means of both groups, the differences between the two and 
the p-values of a test of equality of means for the period 2014Q2-2017Q3. According to the 
table, affected banks have a higher share of deposits than non-affected ones (42.7% vs. 
37.1%), consistent with the findings of Heider et al. (2017). Affected banks also hold a higher 
fraction of excess liquidity (2.6% of total assets) than non-affected ones (1.7 %), which is in line 
with the arguments of Demiralp et al. (2017) and Basten and Mariathasan (2018). In addition, 
affected banks hold a larger proportion of liquid assets, have a lower loan-to-deposit ratio, rely 
more on Eurosystem borrowing, have a larger market share and a slightly higher average 
maturity of their loan portfolio (however, the difference is just one month and a half and, in 
addition, there are not significant differences in terms of the proportion of short term loans). 
Crucially, affected banks are about 1 pp less capitalized than non-affected banks. By contrast, 
there are no significant differences in terms of size, average maturity of liabilities, and weight of 
overnight deposits. 
                                                                          
16 For instance, Heider et al. (2017) measure the intensity of the exposure to the negative DFR with the deposit ratio 
(deposits over total assets). Demiralp et al. (2017) measure it with the ratio between excess liquidity and total assets. 
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4 Negative interest rates and credit supply 
4.1 Loan supply measured from credit growth 
To identify the causal impact of the negative DFR on loan growth, we estimate the following 
diff-in-diff regression for the period 2011Q3-2017Q3: 
∆ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ௜௖௧ ൌ ߙ௖௧ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚܰܦܨܴ௜௧ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺᇱ ൅ 	ߝ௜௖௧		                                   (1) 
The dependent variable, ∆ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ, is the quarterly growth rate of the outstanding loans 
to non-financial corporations (NFCs)17 by bank i in country c at quarter t. This variable is 
regressed on a dummy variable called NDFR that is equal to one for the banks affected by the 
negative DFR (i.e., those for which the negative interest rates lead to a decrease in their net 
interest income) and zero for all banks before 2014Q2. While we believe that we measure the 
negative DFR shock with precision, we cannot rule out the existence of other confounding 
factors that may have an impact on banks’ lending policies. To ameliorate concerns about an 
omitted variable bias, we introduce several sets of controls. First, we include bank fixed effects 
to control for all time-invariant bank heterogeneity. Second, we include country-time fixed 
effects (i.e., a dummy for each country-quarter combination as denoted by ߙ௖௧) to eliminate 
variation in the dependent variable that is specific to a particular country in a particular period of 
time. This large set of dummies controls for all the time-varying country-specific factors that 
influence loan policies (e.g., business cycle). Third, the vector ௜ܺᇱ is a vector of bank-level 
variables. As the existing literature highlights the importance of banks’ balance sheets for the 
transmission of monetary policy (e.g., Jiménez et al., 2012), we include several indicators of 
banks’ financial health (e.g., capital and liquidity ratios) as well as measures of banks’ business 
models (loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio), legal form, size and market share. Fourth, as 
differences in the composition of credit demand (i.e., borrowers’ characteristics and loan 
purposes) can lead to different lending policies, we also control for them in our regressions 
using the answers to the BLS regarding demand developments. Fifth, as the introduction of the 
negative DFR took place concurrently with other non-standard policy measures such as  
the TLTROs, we deal with these confounding events by including the total borrowing from the 
Eurosystem over total assets. Finally, ߝ௜௖௧ is an error term. 
Another identification challenge comes from the fact that our regressor of interest, 
NDFR, is constructed using banks’ self-reports to the BLS. Therefore, banks with bad 
performance (e.g. weak credit growth) because of internal problems may systematically shift 
blame on the negative interest rates. This reverse-causality problem may bias our estimates. To 
mitigate this concern, we control for banks’ self-assessment of their financial conditions. In 
particular, banks in the BLS are asked to assess: (i) their costs related to their capital position; 
(ii) their ability to access market financing; (iii) their liquidity position. By including these variables 
in the specification, we isolate the exogenous variation of NDFR that is independent of 
subjective considerations.  
 The baseline results are reported in column (1) of Table 8. The coefficient on NDFR is 
not statistically different from zero, indicating that there are not significant differences in the 
credit supply of both affected and non-affected banks. This conclusion can also be drawn after 
a graphical analysis (Figure 1) given that the average credit growth of affected and unaffected 
                                                                          
17 To reduce the effect of outliers, the variable has been winsorized at 90%.  
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banks shows similar evolutions over time. The rest of columns of Table 8 show that this finding 
is robust to several variations. In column (2) we include a lag of the dependent variable to 
model the serial correlation of credit growth. In column (3) we drop the bank fixed effects. The 
reason is that, by including bank fixed effects, the within-group estimator identifies the effect of 
NDFR solely based on those banks with temporal variation in that variable and excludes those 
banks for which NDFR is constant (i.e., NDFR=0 for all quarters between 2011Q3 and 
2017Q3). Finally, notice that we have set NDFR equal to zero for all banks before 2014Q2, 
implicitly assuming that all banks were unaffected by the negative interest rates before June 
2014. However, for banks affected by the very low interest rates before 2014Q2 and affected 
by the negative interest rates after 2014Q2 the change from NDFR=0 (before 2014Q2) to 
NDFR=1 (after 2014Q2) may be quite artificial. Hence, in column (4) we restrict the estimation 
to the period after the implementation of the negative interest rates, i.e., 2014Q2-2017Q3.18 In 
all columns the coefficient on NDFR is insignificant. Hence, the results suggest that the reversal 
rate has not been reached in the euro area. 
4.2    Loan supply measured from credit standards 
Another alternative to measure credit supply is through banks’ credit standards. In fact, Lown 
and Morgan (2006) or Ciccarelli et al. (2015), among others, identify credit standards as 
reported in lending surveys as proxies for credit supply. Given that credit standards are defined 
from an answer to the BLS we consider a different methodology to identify the causal impact of 
the negative DFR on credit standards. We estimate an ordered probit model in which the 
dependent variable, ∆ܥܵ, measures changes in credit standards applied by bank i located in 
country c in loans granted to enterprises at quarter t. The ordered probit model is specified  
in terms of a continuous latent variable, latent credit standards, ∆ܥܵ∗: 
∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧∗ ൌ ߙ௖௧ ൅ ߚܰܦܨܴ௜௧ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺᇱ ൅ 	ߝ௜௖௧		                                          (2) 
Observed changes in credit standards ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧, as reported to the BLS, are then related 
to latent changes in credit standards ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧∗  in the following way:  
∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧ ൌ "݁ܽݏ݁݀"       if 			∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧∗ 	൑ ߤଵ 
∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧ 	ൌ "remained	unchanged"		  if 		ߤଵ ൏ ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧∗ 	൑ ߤଶ                                         (3) 
∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧ 	ൌ "ݐ݄݅݃ݐ݁݊݁݀"  if 			∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧∗ 	൐ ߤଷ 
where the parameters ߤଵ, ߤଶ, ߤଷ are thresholds to be jointly estimated with the slope parameters 
by maximum likelihood. We then compute the marginal effects of NDFR. For instance, for the 
probability that credit standards are eased, the corresponding marginal effect is: 
ܲሺ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧ ൌ "݁ܽݏ݁݀" ܰܦܨܴ௜ ൌ 1ሻ െ⁄ ܲሺ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧ ൌ "݁ܽݏ݁݀" ܰܦܨܴ௜ ൌ 0ሻ⁄                   (4) 
To compute (4) we first need to find the response probability in terms of the error term:  
ܲሺ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧ ൌ "݁ܽݏ݁݀"ሻ ൌ 	ܲሺ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧∗ ൑ ߤଵሻ ൌ ܲሺߝ௜௖௧ ൑ ߤଵ െ ߙ௖௧ െ ߚܰܦܨܴ௜ െ ߛ ௜ܺᇱሻ ൌ 
ൌ ܨሺߝ௜௖௧ ൑ ߤଵ െ ߙ௖௧ െ ߚܰܦܨܴ௜ െ ߛ ௜ܺᇱሻ                                                                      (5) 
                                                                          
18 In column (4) we also drop the bank fixed effects, as NDFR has little temporal variation in the period of negative interest 
rates.  
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where F(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
Then we must evaluate the response probabilities at the values of NDFR. Plugging 
ܰܦܨܴ௜௧ ൌ 0,1 into (5):  
ܲሺ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧ ൌ "݁ܽݏ݁݀" ܰܦܨܴ௜௧ ൌ 1ሻ⁄ ൌ 	ܨሺߝ௜௖௧ ൑ ߤଵ െ ߙ௖௧ െ ߚ െ ߛ ௜ܺᇱሻ                     (6) 
ܲሺ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௖௧ ൌ "݁ܽݏ݁݀" ܰܦܨܴ௜௧ ൌ 0ሻ⁄ ൌ 	ܨሺߝ௜௖௧ ൑ ߤଵ െ ߙ௖௧ െ ߛ ௜ܺᇱሻ                            (7) 
Finally, we subtract (7) from (6) to obtain the marginal effect. 
Our empirical strategy implies the comparison of changes in credit standards between 
affected and non-affected banks after the introduction of the negative DFR in June 2014. An 
alternative approach would be to compare those changes between affected and non-affected 
banks before and after June 2014, i.e., a differences-in-difference analysis similar to the one in 
the previous section. The particular nature of our data makes us select the first strategy. 
Specifically, in the BLS banks are asked to report whether their credit standards and their 
terms and conditions have eased, remained unchanged or tightened in the past three months. 
The answers are qualitative, so banks do not provide exact figures (e.g., growth rates) on these 
developments to quantify the intensity of the changes.19 Consider for instance a bank that 
tightened credit standards slightly in the quarter just before the introduction of the negative 
DFR, 2014Q1. If the bank tightens them substantially as a consequence of the negative DFR in 
the quarter just after its introduction, 2014Q2, then the after-before difference will be zero. 
However, the same would be true for another bank that leaves credit standards unchanged 
during that period, so that two banks with very different policies caused by the negative DFR 
would be assigned the same value of the dependent variable. Hence, to avoid this problem we 
focus on the period after the introduction of the negative DFR and compare the outcomes of 
treatment and control banks. 
The results reported in Table 9 reveal that the negative DFR had no significant impact 
on banks’ credit standards, which suggests that banks did not expand their loan supply. We 
next study the effect of the negative DFR on loan terms and conditions which, as the credit 
standards, are contained in the BLS. The fact that the variation in lending volume and credit 
standards of banks adversely affected by negative interest rates is alike the one of non-affected 
banks does not mean that lending supply of the former type of banks is not altered at all. In 
fact, in the next section we study whether affected banks adapt loan terms and conditions 
before cutting the supply of credit. 
                                                                          
19 This notwithstanding, the BLS allows banks to differentiate between “tightened/eased considerably” and 
“tightened/eased somewhat”. However, the low number of answers in those categories, relative to the answers that 
report “unchanged”, makes us avoid that distinction and simply analyze “tightened”, “eased” and “unchanged”. 
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5 The effect of negative interest rates on loan terms and conditions 
5.1 Baseline analysis  
As credit standards, loan terms and conditions refer to the bank answers to several questions 
included in the BLS. Thus, the methodology used to obtain the effect of negative rates on loans 
terms and conditions is the one described in Section 4.2. The results are contained in panels 
A–D of Table 10. Each panel corresponds to a specific loan term or condition and its structure 
is analogous to that of Table 9.  
In view of Panel A, we sustain that the negative DFR did not have an impact on 
collateral requirements. By contrast, negative rates reduced loan maturity (Panel B). In 
particular, affected banks had a 3.7 pp lower probability of increasing loans’ maturity and a 1.6 
pp higher probability of decreasing it. These are strong effects, given that the sample averages 
are 7% and 2%, respectively. This finding suggests that banks affected by the introduction of 
the negative DFR aimed to reduce the effective risk of their loan portfolio by reducing average 
loan maturity.20 In fact, a lower maturity also helps reduce the regulatory risk-weighted assets 
and, hence, the need for capital (see Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, 2011).  
We interpret the two previous findings (no effect on collateral, strong effect on 
maturity) by noticing that collateral requirements and loan maturity may be strategic substitutes 
in reducing the risk of the loan portfolio, in the sense that, as borrowers are less likely to default 
on short-term loans, there is less need to collateralize them. For instance, Boot et al. (1991) 
argue that the longer the maturity, the more likely that the bank will request collateral to align 
the borrower and the lender incentives. Consistent with this view, Mayordomo et al. (2017), in 
their study of personal and real guarantees, find that collateral is increasingly prevalent at longer 
maturities and larger loans. 
 In addition, the negative DFR could imply a reduction of loan size. By reducing their 
average loan size and keeping the overall size of their loan portfolio unchanged, affected banks 
may diversify more their loan portfolio in an attempt to reduce non-systematic risk. This 
hypothesis, which is tested in Panel C, is not corroborated by the data given that the marginal 
effects of NDFR are not statistically different from zero. 
Finally, the negative DFR led to an increase of non-interest charges (Panel D). In 
particular, banks affected by the negative DFR had a 2.7 pp lower probability of reducing non-
interest charges than non-affected competitors and a 2.3 pp higher probability of increasing 
them. This suggests that banks tried to offset the reduction in net interest income by increasing 
commission and fees. 
Results reported in Table 10 document a significant relation between loan terms and 
conditions (maturity and non-interest charges) and negative interest rates. We now provide 
more evidence on whether banks with worse capital ratios among those adversely affected by 
negative interest rates take less risk. For that aim, we perform a new analysis on a subsample 
consisting of the latter group of banks, which are split into low-capital and high-capital banks. 
Based on this subsample, we run a regression analysis in which the dummy ܰܦܨܴ௜௧ in 
equations (2) – (7) is replaced by a dummy variable that is equal to one for banks with a low 
                                                                          
20 Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) and Kirschenmann and Norden (2012), among others, document that the probability of 
default falls as loan maturity is reduced. 
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capital ratio. Low-capital (high-capital) banks are those banks whose average capital ratio over 
the period 2014Q2-2017Q3 is lower than the 25th percentile of the distribution of capital ratios 
for the subsample of banks negatively affected by interest rates. The results are displayed in 
Table 11.   
We find that, among those banks adversely affected by negative rates, the ones with a 
low capital ratio tighten the maturity and non-interest charges of their loans. In particular, 
affected low-capital banks have a 5.9 pp lower probability of lengthening maturity and a 3.2 pp 
higher probability of shortening it. In addition, low-capital banks adversely affected by the 
negative DFR have a 5.2 pp lower probability of reducing non-interest charges than 
competitors with high capital and a 4.9 pp higher probability of increasing them. Finally, we 
document that the marginal effects of low capital on loan size and collateral are not statistically 
different from zero. These findings confirm our hypothesis that low capital limits banks’ risk 
taking, following the negative shock to net worth implied by the negative DFR. Additionally, it 
supports the hypothesis that low-capital banks tried to offset the reduction in net interest 
income, which can be used to build capital organically, by increasing commission and fees. 
The connection between loan terms and conditions and risk taking is corroborated by 
Panel A of Table 12, which shows the estimation results of an ordered probit model in which 
the dependent variable is risk tolerance for the segment of loans to non-financial corporations. 
We find that banks affected by the negative DFR had a 3.4 pp lower probability of increasing 
their risk tolerance and a 4.0 pp higher probability of decreasing it. These are very strong 
effects, given that the sample averages are about 2% in both cases. These findings confirm our 
hypothesis that low capital limits banks’ risk taking, following the negative shock to net worth 
implied by the negative DFR. The stricter loan terms and conditions required by affected banks 
suggest that the negative interest rates exert a negative effect on lending supply. According 
with this statement, banks could adjust first loan terms and conditions and in a later stage 
lending volume. 
However, one could argue that, while the negative interest rates induce lower risk 
taking in the corporate loan market, banks may increase risk taking in other more lucrative 
segments following a “search for yield” strategy. Panels B and C of Table 12 show the 
estimation results for two alternative segments: loans to households for house purchase (Panel B) 
and consumer credit (Panel C). The available evidence, presented in panels B and C, suggests 
that banks do not increase risk taking in these two segments, as the corresponding marginal 
effects of NDFR on risk tolerance are not significant.  
As a complementary view of the lower risk taken by affected banks, we next have a 
closer look at the evolution of the risk-weighted assets of affected and non-affected banks, 
classified from their answers to the BLS question the first time it was included in the survey. 
According to the argument about the central role played by bank capital, a negative DFR 
erodes the affected banks’ profitability and in turn their capacity to generate capital via retained 
earnings and, hence, it can be interpreted as a negative shock to banks’ net worth. If net worth 
decreases to the point where the capital constraint binds, then a bank’s ability to take on 
additional risk becomes limited. The lower risk-taking would go hand on hand with lower RWA. 
Given that this optimization was not accomplished through a cut in the supply of credit, lending 
policies aimed at lowering risk taking represent the main channel to optimize RWA. Figure 2 
depicts the evolution of the ratio of RWA to total assets for the two groups of banks during the 
period 2012-2017, and documents that those negatively affected by negative rates reduce that 
ratio, while unaffected banks increase it. Given that the number of banks adversely affected by 
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negative interest rates exceeds that of non-affected and the fact that affected and non-affected 
banks have a similar size, this figure points towards an overall decrease in RWA. 
A more formal test is carried out by running a diff-in-diff regression similar to (1), in 
which the dependent variable is the ratio of RWA to total assets, for the period 2011Q3-
2017Q3: 
ܴܹܣ ൌ ߙ௖௧ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚܰܦܨܴ௜௧ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺᇱ ൅	ߝ௜௖௧		                                 (8) 
The result of this estimation is presented in Table 13. According to those estimates, 
being affected by the negative DFR reduces the proportion of RWA by 2.7 pp. This effect is 
sizeable when evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable (44.31), it implies that the 
negative interest rates decrease by 5.2% the ratio of RWA over total assets. Hence, this 
evidence is in agreement with the results contained in Table 12 and provides further support to 
the idea that the negative DFR makes affected banks take comparatively less risk probably due 
to the existence of (regulatory and economic) capital constraints.21 
5.2 Extensions and robustness tests 
An interesting question is whether the tightening of terms and conditions depends on the 
competition in the national credit markets. We address this issue by running the previous 
regressions for two subsamples, banks located in countries with high/low market 
concentration, as proxied by having a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) higher/lower than the 
median. Due to the lower number of observations, country-time fixed effects have been 
replaced by (additive) country and time fixed effects plus a vector of country controls.22 
 The results are presented in Table 14. We observe that the marginal effects of NDFR 
are only significant for the sample of high concentration. The effects in the subsample are 
stronger than those reported in Table 10. For instance, affected banks had a 5.3 pp lower 
probability of increasing the maturity of their loans and a 2.6 pp higher probability of decreasing 
it. In addition, the effect on size is also significant, indicating that affected banks also adjust this 
dimension in order to reduce the risk of their overall loan portfolio. These results suggest that 
banks only tighten terms and conditions (maturity, size, non-interest charges) in markets in 
which they do not face strong competitive pressures. By contrast, banks may not tighten terms 
and conditions in very competitive markets due to fear of losing customers and low bargaining 
power.23  
 We also conduct a couple of robustness tests to check the sensitivity of our results. 
First, one may wonder whether negative interest rates are special (for instance, due to the 
effective zero lower bound on retail deposits or the cost of holding excess liquidity) or similar 
effects can occur in times of low but positive interest rates. We investigate this issue by running 
our main regressions (impact of NDFR on credit standards and terms and conditions) on a 
placebo period. The selected period is 2009Q1-2012Q2, a period in which the deposit facility 
rate was low but strictly positive, ranging between 0.25% and 1%. The variable NDFR is time-
invariant and equals 1 during the whole placebo period for those banks whose net interest 
income was adversely affected by negative interest rates and 0 otherwise, as answered by 
                                                                          
21 For a distinction between the two see Elizalde and Repullo (2007).  
22 Those controls are the 10-year sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the harmonised consumer price index, 
the unemployment rate and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Those variables are lagged one period.  
23 Similarly, the report of BIS (2018) finds that net interest margins are considerably more responsive to interest rates in 
less concentrated markets, likely because banks must pass rate declines to their loan customers and have less latitude 
to reduce deposit rates.  
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banks in 2016Q1 (the first time the question on the negative DFR was asked). In other words, we 
are assuming that the banks affected by the negative interest rates were also the ones affected 
by the positive-but-low interest rates. As before, the estimates are obtained from a pooled 
ordered probit as detailed in equations (2) - (7). In view of the results presented in Table 15 we 
conclude that the marginal effects of NDFR on credit standards and terms and conditions are 
insignificant in all regressions. This finding suggests that there is indeed something special in the 
negative interest rates, so that important non-linear effects may take place.  
Second, notice that the key variable in all our analyses, NDFR, is constructed using an 
ad-hoc question that has been asked four times on a semi-annual basis since April 2016. In 
that question banks are asked about the impact of the negative DFR on their net interest 
income over the past six months. However, to maximize sample size, in all the analyses of this 
paper we have assumed that banks reported the cumulative impact since the introduction of 
the negative DFR when answering the question by the first time in April 2016. While this 
assumption seems plausible, it may generate some measurement error in NDFR that may lead 
to inconsistent estimates. Hence, for robustness we carry out the main regressions for the 
period between 2015Q4 (i.e., six months before April 2016) and 2017Q3. The results, 
presented in Table 16, are remarkably similar: affected banks are less likely to ease terms & 
conditions (increase maturity, reduce non-interest charges) and more likely to tighten them 
(decrease maturity, increase non-interest charges). In addition, affected banks are less likely to 
increase their risk tolerance and more likely to decrease it.  
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6 Analysis based on loan-level data 
The previous results suggest that those banks more affected by negative interest rates tend to 
react by diminishing the risk of their loan portfolio without reducing their credit supply. In this 
section we take advantage of the Credit Register of the Bank of Spain (CRR) to dig deeper on 
this issue using information at loan level. 
The CCR contains information on every loan given to non-financial institutions above 
6,000 euros, including the size of the credit instrument and other characteristics such as 
maturity, guarantees and creditworthiness. The fact that these data are available at the firm-
bank level enables us to better control for demand effects and so to isolate the specific effect 
of negative interest rates on the supply of credit. 
We conduct a set of analyses similar to the ones undertaken above for the Euro area 
banks. As before, we classify banks as affected and non-affected. The ten Spanish banks that 
participate in the BLS account around 60% of the total amount of credit outstanding by June 
2014. According to the answers to the first BLS question (April 2016), five of these ten banks 
stated that their net interest income had not been affected by the negative interest rates, 
whereas the other five indicated that they had been adversely affected by this measure. 
Importantly, as in the case of the sample of European banks, we also find that the Spanish 
banks affected by negative interest rates have a capital ratio that on average is 1 pp lower than 
those that report to be unaffected. 
6.1 Loan supply 
We first study whether affected banks modified their flow of new credit activity. To this aim, we 
propose a regression analysis in which the dependent variable (Δln(Creditib)) is the change in 
the logarithm of credit committed by bank b to firm i (in thousands of euros plus one, to deal 
with zeros), both drawn and undrawn, between June 2013 and June 2015 (i.e., the pre- and 
post-event periods depart one year from the date of the event):24  
∆݈݊ሺܥݎ݁݀݅ݐሻ௜௕ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵ ∙ ܰܦܨܴ௕൅ߛܺ௕ᇱ ൅ ߝ௜௕																																																(8) 
where the coefficient β1 indicates whether affected banks increase or diminish the amount of 
loans granted to NFC after the event as compared to non-affected banks. The parameter ߙ௜ 
denotes the use of firm fixed effects to capture demand factors. The vector ܺ௕ contains bank 
characteristics as of 2013 (i.e., before the event). Concretely, we use proxies for bank credit 
risk (non-performing loans over total loans), size (logarithm of total assets), profitability (ROA), 
leverage (total liabilities over total assets), and liquidity (liquid assets over total assets. We have 
210,862 bank-firm observations in total.25 
The results contained in column (1) of Table 17 suggest that there are not significant 
differences in the credit supply of the two types of banks. The results are fully consistent with 
those obtained for Europe and suggest that affected Spanish banks were not operating below 
                                                                          
24 We restrict the sample to those firm-bank pairs for which there is information on both periods. 
25 Notice that (8) is a diff-in-diff estimation in first-differences. We prefer this approach, rather than estimating a long panel 
of credit in levels (i.e., monthly values of the credit stock between June 2013 and June 2015), to eliminate the serial 
correlation problem of diff-in-diff estimates (Bertrand et al, 2014), as in Kwaja and Mian (2008) and Ponticelli and 
Alencar (2016). We avoid this by eliminating the time-series dimension of the data via first-differencing a panel of time 
dimension T=2. Notice that first-differencing also removes the bank fixed effects. 
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their “reversal rate”. The analysis is implemented computing the credit growth up to June 2015 
and at that moment, the DFR was at -0.2% suggesting that the reversal rate is lower than -0.2%. 
However, the current DFR is -0.4% since March 2016 and so, the previous results do not provide 
enough evidence to conclude that the “reversal rate” has not been reached yet. For this reason, in 
column (2) we extent the post-event period up to June 2016 to obtain the growth rate of credit 
and conduct a similar analysis to that summarized in equation (8). The coefficient associated to 
the dummy denoting the banks adversely affected by negative interest rates is not statistically 
different from zero suggesting that the reversal rate would fall below -0.4%.  
To get a deeper understanding of how affected and unaffected banks adjust their 
supply of loans to different firms’ segments of risk, we extend equation (8) by including an 
interaction term capturing firms’ risk. We measure firm risk by means of a dummy variable, 
denoted as DISTi, that is equal to one if a firm is in the “distress zone” according to the 
Altman’s Z-score corresponding to December 2012 and zero otherwise.26 This variable is 
interacted with the dummy variable NDFRb: 
∆ܮ݋݃ሺܥݎ݁݀݅ݐሻ௜௕ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵܰܦܨܴ௕ ൅ ߚଶܰܦܨܴ௕ ∙ ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ ൅ ߛܺ௕ᇱ൅ߝ௜௕	                (9) 
where coefficient βଵ indicates whether the increase in the supply of credit of affected banks to 
safer firms after June 2014 exceeds that of non-affected banks. The linear combination of 
coefficients βଵ and βଶ indicates whether the increase in the supply of credit of affected banks 
to riskier firms after June 2014 exceeds that of non-affected banks to the same type of firms. 
Results are reported in column (3) of Table 17. The number of observations of this 
estimation decreases around 60% because of the lack of the balance-sheet information 
required for computing the Z-score for all the firms for which we observe the bank-firm credit 
exposure. The positive and significant coefficient βଵ indicates that the supply of credit of 
affected banks to safer firms increases significantly more than that of non-affected banks. On 
the contrary, affected banks reduce their credit supply to riskier firms by more than non-
affected banks such that the linear combination of coefficients ߚଵ and ߚଶ is negative (-0.019) 
and statistically different from zero. On average, the supply of credit of an affected bank to the 
average riskier firm in the sample decreases by 1.9 % more than that of non-affected banks. It 
confirms that affected banks decrease their credit supply to the segment of riskier firms more 
than non-affected banks after the date in which the DFR turns into the negative territory.  
6.2 Maturity and collateral 
We next study whether the propensity to reduce the risk of the loan portfolios of affected banks 
also lead them to shorten the maturity of their loans. For that aim, we propose an analysis 
similar to the one summarized in equation (8) and conducted on the same sample period. The 
dependent variable in this analysis is the change between June 2013 and June 2015 in the 
proportion of firm i’s outstanding short-term loans (i.e., maturity lower than one year) with bank 
b over the total amount of loans outstanding of that firm with the same bank (∆݄ܵ݋ݎݐܴݑ݊ܥݎ௜௕). 
We regress this variable on a dummy variable that is equal to one if the bank declares being 
affected by the negative rate (NDFRb), firm fixed effects and pre-shock bank variables In total, 
we have 190,655 bank-firm observations. The regression equation is as follows: 
∆݄ܵ݋ݎݐܴݑ݊ܥݎ௜௕ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵܰܦܨܴ௕ ൅ ߛܺ௕ᇱ൅ߝ௜௕																																													 (10) 
                                                                          
26 The Z-score is estimated based on the specification for private firms according to which the safe zone is the one in 
which the Z-score is lower than 1.23. For more details, see Altman (1968). 
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where the coefficient β1 indicates whether affected banks increase or diminish the amount of 
short-run loans after the event as compared to non-affected banks. 
The results obtained from the estimation of equation (10) for the variable ΔShortRunCr 
are reported in column (1) of Table 18. They support the lower risk appetite of affected banks 
and their tendency to shorten the maturity of their loans. More specifically, the proportion of 
short-term loans in the portfolio of affected banks increases by 3.3 % more than that for non-
affected banks.  
 To check whether the negative DFR contributed to alter the requirement of collateral 
by affected banks, we perform a regression analysis similar to that in equation (10) but using as 
a dependent variable the change in the proportion of loans of firm i in bank b with collateral. 
This proportion is obtained by means of a weighted average in which the weights are 
proportional to the size of each loan. The results are reported in column (2) of Table 17. We 
observe that, after the introduction of a negative DFR, affected banks require collateral to a 
higher extent than non-affected banks. 
Putting things together, the previous results reveal the preference of banks affected by 
the negative DFR towards a safer loans portfolio, presumably as a way to optimize their relatively 
lower capital ratios, as supported by Figure 2. The reduction in the level of risk of the loans given 
by affected banks’ would have been accomplished through a shortening of the maturity of new 
loans and a higher demand for collateral, both as compared to non-affected banks. 
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7 Conclusions 
This paper offers new empirical evidence on the relevance of the various channels through 
which negative interest rates affect banks’ net interest income in the context of the recent 
experience of the Euro area. To this aim, we exploit survey data at the bank-level. We find that 
those banks that report a negative impact of negative rates on their net interest income have 
capital ratios that on average are significantly lower than those banks that report to be 
unaffected. 
Banks reporting a higher incidence of negative interest rates on their net interest 
incomes tend to exhibit lower risk tolerance and grant loans with shorter maturity and lower 
average loan size. As affected banks are less capitalized, these results could probably reflect 
the limitation of those banks to expand their risk weighted assets as a way to compensate for 
lower unit lending margins. In fact, we find that the lower risk-taking goes hand on hand with 
lower RWA. We report qualitatively consistent findings when we use very detailed loan level 
data obtained from the Spanish official credit registry. 
In addition, we find that those European banks whose net interest income is adversely 
affected by the negative interest rates attempt to offset the adverse effect on net interest 
income by increasing non-interest charges, so that the generated revenue can be used to build 
capital organically. Finally, the results obtained from both the Euro area and Spanish datasets 
suggest that there are no significant differences in terms of the supply of credit by those banks 
whose net lending margins are affected by negative interest rates and those that are not. Within 
the logic of hypothesis recently put forward by Brunnermeier’s and Koby (2017) about the so-
called reversal rate, our results provide support to the view that for the average bank the 
interest rates are not sufficiently low so as to exert a negative effect on the supply of credit. It 
may also reflect that banks could adjust first loan terms and conditions and in a later stage 
lending volume.  
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Figure 1: Average credit growth. This figure summarizes the evolution of the average 
quarterly growth rate of loans to NFCs for affected banks and non-affected banks 
 
 
Figure 2: RWA over total assets. This figure summarizes the evolution of the median ratio of 
RWA over total assets at the end of each year for affected banks and non-affected banks. 
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Table 1: Number of banks and number of observations by country 
This table summarizes the number of banks in our sample for each country as of 2017Q3 and the 
number of observations corresponding to each country for the whole sample period 2014Q2-
2017Q3. 
  Number of banks (2017Q3) Number of observations (2014Q2-2017Q3)
Country Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
AT 8 6.56 109 6.49 
BE 4 3.3 56 3.3 
DE 26 21.3 375 22.3 
EE 4 3.3 56 3.3 
ES 10 8.2 140 8.3 
FR 14 11 196 12 
IE 7 5.74 98 5.83 
IT 22 18.0 284 16.9 
LT 4 3.3 44 2.6 
LU 5 4.1 70 4.2 
NL 8 6.6 112 6.7 
PT 5 4 70 4 
SK 5 4.1 70 4.17 
Total 122 100 1,680 100 
 
Table 2: Definition of variables 
This table contains the definition of the dependent variables used in the analyses implemented along the 
paper plus the set of control variables used to measure demand and bank characteristics. 
Dependent variables   
credit standards Change in the overall credit standards applied to new loans or  
credit lines to enterprises. 
credit growth Quarterly growth rate of loans to non-financial corporations.  
RWA Risk-weighted assets over total assets, in %.  
non_interest_charges Change in the non-interest charges for new loans or credit lines to enterprises. 
loan_size Change in the size of the loans or credit lines to enterprises. 
collateral Change in the collateral requirements of the loans or credit lines to 
enterprises.  
maturity Change in the maturity of the loans or credit lines to enterprises.  
risk tolerance Change in the level of the bank's risk tolerance.  
Demand variables   
demand_sme Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to small and medium 
enterprises.  
demand_large Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to large firms.  
demand_short_term Change in the demand for short-term loans or credit lines to enterprises. 
demand_long_term Change in the demand for long-term loans or credit lines to enterprises. 
demand_investment Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises for fixed 
investment.  
demand_inventories Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises for inventories  
and working capital.  
demand_mergers Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises for  
mergers/acquisitions and corporate restructuring.  
demand_debt_refinancing Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises for debt  
refinancing/restructuring and renegotiation.  
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Table 2: Definition of variables (cont'd) 
Bank variables   
NDFR Dummy that equals 1 if the negative deposit facility rate contributed  
to a decrease in the bank's net interest income.  
size Logarithm of the bank's total assets. 
capital ratio  Capital and reserves over total assets (%) 
liquidity ratio Cash + government securities + Eurosystem deposits over total assets (%) 
loan-to-deposit ratio  Loans to non-financial corporations and households over deposits by 
non-financial corporations and households. In logs. 
deposit ratio Deposits by households and non-financial corporations over total assets (%). 
eurosystem borrowing  Total borrowing from the Eurosystem (marginal lending facility + main  
refinancing operations 
  + fine-tuning operations) over total assets (%) 
excess liquidity Excess liquidity (deposit facility + current account - minimum  
reserve requirements) over total assets (%) 
market_share  Ratio between a bank's total assets and the total assets of  
the country's banking sector (%).   
legal_form: foreign branch  Dummy that equals 1 if the bank is a branch of a foreign bank.  
legal_form: foreign 
subsidiary  
Dummy that equals 1 if the bank is a subsidiary of a foreign bank.  
legal_form: head institution Dummy that equals 1 if the bank is the head institution of the banking group.  
legal_form: national 
subsidiary 
Dummy that equals 1 if the bank is a subsidiary of a domestic bank.  
capital position costs Changes in the costs related to the bank's capital position, as reported in the BLS. 
access market financing Changes in the bank's ability to access market financing, as reported in the BLS. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables 
This table contains the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables referred to credit standards, 
credit growth, loan terms and conditions and bank risk tolerance that are used along the analyses 
implemented in the paper for the sample period 2014Q2-2017Q3. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Credit            
credit standards: eased 1,611 0.05 0.22 0 1 
credit standards: unchanged  1,611 0.93 0.26 0 1 
credit standards: tightened 1,611 0.02 0.14 0 1 
            
credit growth 1,502 0.20 3.64 -7.93 7.49 
RWA 1,310 43.55 14.16 16.57 85.56 
Terms and conditions           
non_interest_charges: eased 1,603 0.04 0.21 0 1 
non_interest_charges: unchanged  1,603 0.93 0.26 0 1 
non_interest_charges: tightened 1,603 0.03 0.17 0 1 
            
loan_size: eased 1,604 0.06 0.24 0 1 
loan_size: unchanged  1,604 0.93 0.26 0 1 
loan_size: tightened 1,604 0.01 0.10 0 1 
            
collateral: eased 1,603 0.05 0.21 0 1 
collateral: unchanged  1,603 0.94 0.23 0 1 
collateral: tightened 1,603 0.01 0.10 0 1 
            
maturity: eased 1,601 0.07 0.25 0 1 
maturity: unchanged  1,601 0.92 0.27 0 1 
maturity: tightened 1,601 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Risk tolerance           
risk tolerance: increased 1,241 0.02 0.14 0 1 
risk tolerance: unchanged  1,241 0.96 0.19 0 1 
risk tolerance: decreased 1,241 0.02 0.13 0 1 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of bank characteristics 
This table contains the descriptive statistics of the bank characteristics that are used as independent 
variables along the analyses implemented in the paper for the sample period 2014Q2-2017Q3. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
NDFR 1,680 0.73 0.44 0 1 
size 1,644 10.69 1.54 2.77 13.88 
capital ratio  1,640 10.68 6.06 0.25 100.00 
liquidity ratio 1,644 8.21 6.35 0.00 32.38 
loan-to-deposit ratio (log) 1,612 0.39 1.42 -1.57 10.00 
deposit ratio 1,644 40.78 22.45 0.00 87.00 
eurosystem borrowing  1,644 1.03 2.51 0.00 17.39 
excess liquidity 1,168 2.29 4.42 0.00 27.71 
market_share  1,651 6.05 7.64 0.00 41.92 
legal_form: foreign branch  1,680 0.04 0.19 0 1 
legal_form: foreign subsidiary  1,680 0.20 0.40 0 1 
legal_form: head institution  1,680 0.50 0.0 0 1 
legal_form: national subsidiary 1,680 0.26 0.44 0 1 
capital position costs: eased 1,596 0.01 0.12 0 1 
capital position costs: unchanged 1,596 0.97 0.18 0 1 
capital position costs: tightened  1,596 0.02 0.14 0 1 
access market financing: eased 1,546 0.02 0.14 0 1 
access market financing: unchanged 1,546 0.98 0.14 0 1 
access market financing: tightened 1,546 0.00 0.04 0 1 
liquidity position: eased 1,592 0.04 0.20 0 1 
liquidity position: unchanged 1,592 0.96 0.21 0 1 
liquidity position: tightened 1,592 0.00 0.06 0 1 
 
  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1832 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of demand variables 
This table contains the descriptive statistics of the demand variables that are used as control variables 
along the analyses implemented in the paper for the sample period 2014Q2-2017Q3. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
demand_sme: decreased 1,566 0.12 0.33 0 1 
demand_sme: unchanged  1,566 0.65 0.48 0 1 
demand_sme: increased 1,566 0.23 0.42 0 1 
            
demand_large: decreased 1,561 0.11 0.31 0 1 
demand_large: unchanged  1,561 0.68 0.47 0 1 
demand_large: increased 1,561 0.21 0.41 0 1 
            
demand_short_term: decreased 1,627 0.10 0.31 0 1 
demand_short_term: unchanged  1,627 0.71 0.45 0 1 
demand_short_term: increased 1,627 0.18 0.39 0 1 
            
demand_long_term: decreased 1,627 0.10 0.29 0 1 
demand_long_term: unchanged 1,627 0.64 0.48 0 1 
demand_long_term: increased 1,627 0.26 0.44 0 1 
            
demand_investment: decreased 1,626 0.11 0.32 0 1 
demand_investment: unchanged  1,626 0.69 0.46 0 1 
demand_investment: increased 1,626 0.20 0.40 0 1 
            
demand_inventories: decreased 1,605 0.06 0.24 0 1 
demand_inventories: unchanged  1,605 0.76 0.43 0 1 
demand_inventories: increased 1,605 0.18 0.38 0 1 
            
demand_mergers: decreased 1,608 0.03 0.17 0 1 
demand_mergers: unchanged  1,608 0.85 0.35 0 1 
demand_mergers: increased 1,608 0.12 0.32 0 1 
            
demand_debt_refinancing: decreased 1,621 0.03 0.16 0 1 
demand_debt_refinancing: unchanged  1,621 0.85 0.36 0 1 
demand_debt_refinancing: increased 1,621 0.12 0.33 0 1 
 
  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1832 
Table 6: Number of observations of affected and non-affected banks by country 
This table summarizes the number of observations in our sample for each country for the group of 
affected banks (NDFR=1) and non-affected banks (NDFR=0) for the period 2014Q2-2017Q3. 
  NDFR=1 NDFR=0 
Country Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
AT 85 6.9 24 5.3 
BE 40 3.3 16 3.5 
DE 314 25.6 61 13.4 
EE 40 3.3 16 3.5 
ES 82 6.7 58 12.8 
FR 99 8.1 97 21.4 
IE 44 3.6 54 11.9 
IT 204 16.6 80 17.6 
LT 38 3.1 6 1.3 
LU 64 5.2 6 1.3 
NL 94 7.7 18 4.0 
PT 68 5.6 2 0.4 
SK 54 4.4 16 3.5 
Total 1,226 100 454 100 
 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of bank characteristics for affected and non-affected banks 
This table contains the number of observations and means of bank characteristics for the banks that are affected 
(NDFR=1) and non-affected by the negative DFR (NDFR=0). It also includes the difference in means between the 
two groups and the p-value associated with a two-sample t-test of equality of means. The sample period is 
2014Q2-2017Q3. 
  NDFR=1 NDFR=0 Difference in means 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Diff P-value 
Size 1,206 10.69 452 10.67 0.02 0.77 
Capital ratio  1,206 10.34 448 11.51 -1.17 0.00 
Liquidity ratio 1,206 8.75 452 6.92 1.83 0.00 
Loan-to-deposit ratio (log) 1,197 0.27 429 0.69 -0.42 0.00 
Deposit ratio 1,206 42.67 452 37.05 5.62 0.00 
Eurosystem borrowing  1,206 1.16 452 0.66 0.50 0.00 
Excess liquidity 863 2.63 319 1.68 0.96 0.00 
Market_share  1,209 6.52 456 4.64 1.87 0.00 
Legal_form: foreign branch  1,238 0.04 456 0.04 -0.01 0.55 
Legal_form: foreign subsidiary  1,238 0.21 456 0.20 0.01 0.58 
Legal_form: head institution 1,238 0.54 456 0.36 0.18 0.00 
Legal_form: national subsidiary 1,238 0.21 456 0.39 -0.19 0.00 
Loan maturity 1,199 60.13 440 58.32 1.81 0.03 
Weight overdraft loans 1,199 0.15 440 0.15 0.00 0.80 
Weight loans up to 1 year 1,199 0.23 440 0.24 -0.01 0.31 
Deposit maturity 1,197 4.12 429 4.44 -0.33 0.27 
Weight overnight deposits 1,197 0.65 429 0.64 0.00 0.69 
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Table 8: Negative interest rates and credit growth 
This table shows the effect of the negative deposit facility rate (NDFR) on the supply of loans to non-financial 
corporations. The results are obtained from a within-group estimator of a model with bank fixed effects (columns 1 
and 2) and from an OLS estimator (columns 3 and 4). The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of loans 
to NFCs. It is regressed on NDFR, bank and demand controls. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, 
loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, Eurosystem borrowing,  market share and legal form of the bank, as well as 
dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the bank's cost of capital, the bank's ability to 
access market financing and the bank's liquidity position. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes 
(decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: 
SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans 
for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. In addition, we use country-time fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Sample period 2011Q3-2017Q3 2011Q3-2017Q3 2011Q3-2017Q3 2014Q2-2017Q3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables credit growth credit growth credit growth credit growth 
          
NDFR 0.184 0.219 0.090 0.139 
  (0.223) (0.231) (0.217) (0.238) 
Lagged dependent variable NO YES NO NO 
Bank controls YES YES YES YES 
Demand controls YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES NO NO 
Country-Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,246 2,146 2,246 1,303 
R-squared 0.259 0.262 0.293 0.323 
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Table 9: Negative interest rates and credit standards 
This table shows the marginal effect of the negative deposit facility rate (NDFR) on the credit  standards  
to non-financial corporations of those banks whose net interest income was adversely affected by 
negative interest rates. The results are obtained from a pooled ordered probit as detailed in equations 
(2) - (7). The dependent variable, credit standards, takes the values 1 (eased), 2 (remained unchanged) 
and 3 (tightened) and is regressed on NDFR, bank controls and demand controls. Bank controls are 
size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, Eurosystem borrowing, market 
share and legal form of the bank, as well as dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, 
increase) in the bank's cost of capital, the bank's ability to access market financing and the bank's 
liquidity position. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) 
in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: SMEs and large firms, 
short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for 
mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. In addition, we use country-time 
fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) contain the results referred to the effect of the NDFR on the probability 
that credit standards are eased and tightened, respectively. The sample period is 2014Q2-2017Q3. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(credit standards=eased) P(credit standards=tightened) 
      
NDFR 0.018 -0.006 
  (0.013) (0.004) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
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Table 10: Negative interest rates and terms & conditions 
This table shows the marginal effect of the negative deposit facility rate (NDFR) on several terms and 
conditions of loans to non-financial corporations of those banks whose net interest income was 
adversely affected by negative interest rates. The results are obtained from a pooled ordered probit 
as detailed in equations (2) - (7). The dependent variables, which refer to several terms and 
conditions, take the values 1 (eased), 2 (remained unchanged) and 3 (tightened) and are regressed 
on NDFR, bank controls and demand controls. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, 
loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, Eurosystem borrowing, market share and legal form of the bank, 
as well as dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the bank's cost of 
capital, the bank's ability to access market financing and the bank's liquidity position. Demand 
controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit 
by non-financial corporations in the following segments: SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and 
long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions 
and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. In addition, we use country-time fixed effects. Panel A 
refers to the probability that collateral requirements are eased or tightened. Panel B contain the 
results referred to the effect of the NDFR on the probability that the maturity is eased (lengthened) or 
tightened (shortened). Panel C contains the results referred to the effect of the NDFR on the 
probability that the loan size is increased or decreased. Finally, the results in Panel D refer to 
the effect of the NDFR on the probability that the non-interest charges decreased or increased. The 
sample period is 2014Q2-2017Q3. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank 
level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A   
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(collateral=eased) P(collateral=tightened) 
      
NDFR -0.014 0.004 
  (0.015) (0.005) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 1,511 1,511 
      
Panel B   
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(maturity=increased) P(maturity=decreased) 
      
NDFR -0.037*** 0.016** 
  (0.013) (0.007) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 1,511 1,511 
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Table 10: Negative interest rates and terms & conditions (cont'd) 
Panel C   
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(size=increased) P(size=decreased) 
      
NDFR -0.022 0.003 
  (0.014) (0.002) 
Bank and Demand 
Controls 
YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 1,511 1,511 
Panel D   






      
NDFR -0.027*** 0.023*** 
  (0.010) (0.009) 
Bank and Demand 
Controls 
YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 1,510 1,510 
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Table 11: Negative interest rates, terms and conditions and capital 
This table shows the marginal effect of having low capital on several terms and conditions of loans to 
non-financial corporations for those banks whose net interest income was adversely affected by 
negative interest rates (NDFR=1). The results are obtained from a pooled ordered probit as detailed in 
equations (2) - (7). The dependent variables, which refer to several terms and conditions, take the values 
1 (eased), 2 (remained unchanged) and 3 (tightened) and are regressed on a dummy indicating low 
capital, bank controls and demand controls. The dummy for low capital equals 1 if the bank's average 
capital ratio over the period is lower than the 25th percentile of the distribution of capital ratios. The 
dependent variables are collateral in panel A, maturity  in panel B, size in panel C and non-interest 
charges in panel D.  Bank controls are size, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, 
Eurosystem borrowing, market share and legal form of the bank, as well as dummy variables for 
changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the bank's cost of capital, the bank's ability to access 
market financing and the bank's liquidity position. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes 
(decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following 
segments: SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, 
loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. In 
addition, we use country-time fixed effects. The sample period is 2014Q2-2017Q3 and consists of 
observations in which NDFR equals 1. . Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank 
level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A   
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(collateral=eased) P(collateral=tightened) 
Low capital 0.026 -0.005 
  (0.016) (0.003) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 899 899 
Panel B   
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(maturity=increased) P(maturity=decreased) 
Low capital -0.059*** 0.032** 
  (0.022) (0.015) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 898 898 
Panel C   
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(size=increased) P(size=decreased) 
Low capital 0.014 -0.002 
  (0.026) (0.004) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 899 899 
Panel D   






Low capital -0.052** 0.049*** 
  (0.021) (0.019) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 898 898 
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Table 12: Negative interest rates and risk tolerance 
This table shows the marginal effect of the negative deposit facility rate (NDFR) on the risk tolerance of those 
banks whose net interest income was adversely affected by negative interest rates. The results are obtained 
from a pooled ordered probit as detailed in equations (2) - (7). The dependent variable is risk tolerance and 
takes the values 1 (increased), 2 (remained unchanged) and 3 (decreased). Banks' risk tolerance is measured 
in three different segments: loans to NFCs (panel A), loans to households for house purchase (panel B) and 
consumer credit and other lending to households (panel C). Risk tolerance is regressed on NDFR, bank 
controls and demand controls. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, 
deposit ratio, Eurosystem borrowing, market share and legal form of the bank, as well as dummy variables for 
changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the bank's cost of capital, the bank's ability to access market 
financing and the bank's liquidity position. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, 
unchanged, increase) in each credit segment, as well as changes in the factors behind those developments. 
In the case of loans to NFCs, demand controls are changes in the demand of credit by non-financial 
corporations in the following segments: SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for 
fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt 
refinancing/restructuring. In the case of loans to households for house purchase, demand controls are 
changes in the demand of housing loans and changes in the demand due to housing market prospects, 
consumer confidence, the general level of interest rates, debt refinancing needs and the regulatory and fiscal 
regime of housing markets. In the case of consumer credit, demand controls are changes in the demand for 
consumer credit and changes in the demand due to spending in durable goods, consumer confidence, the 
general level of interest rates and mortgage equity withdrawals. In addition, we use country-time fixed effects 
or country fixed effects, time fixed effects and macro controls. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign 
bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate and the consumer price index. The sample 
period is 2014Q2-2017Q3. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A Loans to NFCs 
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(risk tolerance=increased) P(risk tolerance=decreased) 
NDFR -0.034*** 0.040*** 
  (0.010) (0.011) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
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Table 12: Negative interest rates and risk tolerance (cont'd) 
Panel B Loans to households for house purchase 
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(risk tolerance=increased) P(risk tolerance=decreased) 
      
NDFR 0.006 -0.004 
  (0.005) (0.003) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 1,229 1,229 
      
Panel C Consumer credit and other lending to households 
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(risk tolerance=increased) P(risk tolerance=decreased) 
      
NDFR -0.003 0.002 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE NO NO 
Country FE YES YES 
Time FE YES YES 
Macro controls YES YES 
Observations 1,024 1,024 
 
Table 13: Negative interest rates and risk-weighted assets. Diff-in-diff analysis 
This table shows the effect of the negative deposit facility rate (NDFR) on risk-weighted assets 
(RWA). The results are obtained from a within-group estimator of a model with bank fixed effects. 
The dependent variable is RWA over total assets. The dependent variable is regressed on NDFR, 
bank and demand controls. Bank controls are size, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit 
ratio, Eurosystem borrowing,  market share and legal form of the bank, as well as dummy 
variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the bank's cost of capital, the bank's 
ability to access market financing and the bank's liquidity position. In addition, we use country-
time fixed effects.  The sample period is 2011Q3-2017Q3. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Variables RWA over total assets 
NDFR -2.698** 
  (1.357) 
Bank controls YES 
Bank FE YES 
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Table 14: Negative interest rates, credit standards and terms and conditions  
(high and low market concentration) 
This table shows the marginal effect of the negative deposit facility rate (NDFR) on credit standards and terms 
and conditions on loans to non-financial corporations for banks located in countries with low Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI lower than the median) and high Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI higher than the median). 
The variable NDFR equals 1 for those banks whose net interest income was adversely affected by negative 
interest rates and 0 otherwise. The results are obtained from a pooled ordered probit as detailed in equations (2) 
- (7). The dependent variables are credit standards in panel A, collateral in panel B, maturity in panel C, size in 
panel D and non-interest charges in panel E. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased), 2 (remained 
unchanged) and 3 (tightened). Columns (1) and (3) ((2) and (4)) show the marginal effect of NDFR on the 
probability that each dependent variable is eased (tightened). The independent variables are NDFR, bank 
controls, demand controls, macro controls, country dummies and time dummies. Bank controls are size, capital 
ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, Eurosystem borrowing, market share and legal form of the 
bank. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of 
credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-
term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt 
refinancing/restructuring. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the 
unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The sample period is 
2014Q2-2017Q3. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A LOW HHI HIGH HHI 










          
NDFR 0.026 -0.002 0.026* -0.017 
  (0.024) (0.002) (0.014) (0.011) 
Observations 735 735 708 708 
Panel B LOW HHI HIGH HHI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables P(collateral=eased) P(collateral=tightened) P(collateral=eased) P(collateral=tightened)
          
NDFR 0.007 -0.001 -0.008 0.004 
  (0.013) (0.003) (0.013) (0.007) 
Observations 730 730 855 855 
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Table 14: Negative interest rates, credit standards and terms  
and conditions (high and low market concentration) (cont'd) 
Panel C LOW HHI HIGH HHI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables P(maturity=eased) P(maturity=tightened) P(maturity=eased) P(maturity=tightened)
          
NDFR -0.004 0.001 -0.053*** 0.026** 
  (0.014) (0.004) (0.019) (0.011) 
Observations 730 730 708 708 
Panel D LOW HHI HIGH HHI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables P(size=increased) P(size=decreased) P(size=increased) P(size=decreased) 
          
NDFR -0.025 0.002 -0.048** 0.013* 
  (0.017) (0.002) (0.024) (0.008) 
Observations 730 730 708 708 
Panel E LOW HHI HIGH HHI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 
P (non-interest  
charges=decreased) 
P (non-interest  
charges=increased) 
P (non-interest  
charges=decreased) 
P (non-interest  
charges=increased) 
          
NDFR 0.002 -0.001 -0.031** 0.035** 
  (0.014) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
Observations 729 729 708 708 
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Table 15: Low interest rates, credit standards and terms and conditions (placebo period) 
This table shows the marginal effect of the negative deposit facility rate (NDFR) on credit standards 
and terms and conditions on loans to non-financial corporations on a placebo period. The variable 
NDFR equals 1 for those banks whose net interest income was adversely affected by negative interest 
rates and 0 otherwise, as answered by banks in 2016Q1. The sample period is 2009Q1-2012Q2, a 
period in which the deposit facility rate was low but strictly positive, ranging between 0.25% and 1%. 
The results are obtained from a pooled ordered probit as detailed in equations (2) - (7). The dependent 
variables are credit standards in panel A, collateral in panel B, maturity  in panel C, size in panel D and 
non-interest charges in panel E. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased), 2 (remained 
unchanged) and 3 (tightened). Columns (1) and (2) show the marginal effect of NDFR on the 
probability that each dependent variable is eased and tightened, respectively. The independent 
variables are NDFR, bank controls, demand controls and country-time dummies. Bank controls are 
size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, Eurosystem borrowing, market 
share and legal form of the bank. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, 
unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: 
SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for 
inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A   (1) (2) 
Variables P(credit standards=eased) P(credit standards=tightened) 
NDFR -0.001 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.021) 
Observations 925 925 
Panel B  (1) (2) 
Variables P(collateral=eased) P(collateral=tightened) 
NDFR -0.003 0.022 
  (0.004) (0.030) 
Observations 925 925 
Panel C  (1) (2) 
Variables P(maturity=eased) P(maturity=tightened) 
NDFR -0.000 0.001 
  (0.007) (0.022) 
Observations 922 922 
Panel D  (1) (2) 
Variables P(size=increased) P(size=decreased) 
NDFR -0.009 0.019 
  (0.009) (0.019) 
Observations 925 925 
Panel F  (1) (2) 
Variables P(non-interest charges=decreased) P(non-interest charges=increased)
NDFR 0.002 -0.010 
  (0.005) (0.021) 
Observations 925 925 
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Table 16: Negative interest rates, credit standards  
and terms and conditions (short period) 
This table shows the marginal effect of the negative deposit facility rate (NDFR) on several terms 
and conditions of loans to non-financial corporations of those banks whose net interest income 
was adversely affected by negative interest rates. The results are obtained from a pooled 
ordered probit as detailed in equations (2) - (7). The dependent variables, which refer to several 
terms and conditions, take the values 1 (eased), 2 (remained unchanged) and 3 (tightened) and 
are regressed on NDFR, bank controls and demand controls. The dependent variables are 
credit standards in panel A, collateral in panel B, maturity  in panel C, size in panel D, non-
interest charges in panel E and risk tolerance in panel F. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, 
liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, Eurosystem borrowing, market share and legal 
form of the bank, as well as dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in 
the bank's cost of capital, the bank's ability to access market financing and the bank's liquidity 
position. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) 
in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: SMEs and 
large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for 
inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. In 
addition, we use country-time fixed effects. The sample period is 2015Q4-2017Q3. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A   
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(credit standards=eased) P(credit standards=tightened) 
      
NDFR 0.021* -0.006 
  (0.012) (0.004) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 690 690 
Panel B   
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(collateral=eased) P(collateral=tightened) 
      
NDFR -0.030* 0.006 
  (0.017) (0.004) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 759 759 
Panel C   
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(maturity=increased) P(maturity=decreased) 
      
NDFR -0.027** 0.016** 
  (0.011) (0.008) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 760 760 
 
  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 45 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1832 
Panel D   
 (1) (2) 
Variables P(size=increased) P(size=decreased) 
   
NDFR 0.010 -0.002 
  (0.018)  (0.003) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 688 688 
Panel E   






      
NDFR -0.022** 0.026*** 
  (0.009) (0.010) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 760 760 
Panel F   
  (1) (2) 
Variables P(risk tolerance=increased) P(risk tolerance=decreased) 
      
NDFR -0.029*** 0.037*** 
  (0.011) (0.014) 
Bank and Demand Controls YES YES 
Country-Time FE YES YES 
Observations 743 743 
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Table 17: Negative interest rates and credit supply. Evidence from Spain 
This table contains the coefficients estimated for a regression analysis in which the dependent 
variable is the first-difference of the logarithm of credit committed by bank j to firm i (in thousands of 
euros plus one, to deal with zeros), both drawn and undrawn. In column (1) we use a pre- and a 
post-event period that departs one year from the date of the event (i.e., June 2013 and June 2015) 
to obtain the variation in credit whereas in column (2) the post-event period is extended up to June 
2016. Columns (1) and (2) report the result obtained when the corresponding dependent variable is 
regressed on a variable that is equal to one if the negative DFR (NDFR) contributed to a decrease of 
the net interest margin of bank b and zero otherwise plus bank characteristics and firm fixed effects 
as detailed in equation (8). In column (3) we report the results obtained from the estimation of 
equation (9) in which we extend the analysis in column (1) by including an interaction term capturing 
firms’ risk. We measure firm risk by means of a dummy variable, denoted as DIST, that is equal to 
one if a firm is in the “distress zone” according to the Altman’s Z-score corresponding to December 
2012 and zero otherwise. This variable is interacted with the dummy variable NDFR.The number of 
observations of this estimation decreases around 60% with respect to column (1) because the lack 
of the balance-sheet information required for computing the Z-score for all the firms for which we 
observe the bank-firm credit exposure. Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
NDFR -0.002 0.009 0.028** 
  [0.006] [0.009] [0.012] 
NDFR * DIST     -0.047*** 
      [0.011] 
Bank Characteristics YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Observations 210,862 170,410 89,260 
R-squared 0.432 0.457 0.436 
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Table 18: Negative interest rates and loan maturity and collateral. Evidence from Spain 
This table summarizes the effect of negative interest rates on the loan maturity and collateral for a 
sample of Spanish banks and firms. The dependent variable in column (1) is the change between 
June 2013 and June 2015 in the proportion of firm i’s outstanding short-term loans (i.e., maturity 
lower than one year) with bank b at time t over the total amount of loans outstanding of that firm 
with the same bank at that time. The dependent variable in (2) is the change in the proportion of 
loans of firm i in bank b with collateral between the same two years. Both dependent variables are 
regressed on a dummy variable that is equal to one if the negative DFR contributed to a decrease 
of the net interest margin of bank b, and zero otherwise, plus bank characteristics and firm fixed 
effects. Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
  
SR Maturity              
(1-year) 
Guarantee 
NDFR 0.033*** 0.031*** 
  [0.003] [0.002] 
Bank Characteristics YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Observations 210,861 210,862 
R-squared 0.413 0.439 
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